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Abstract
Under bond-rate transmission of monetary policy, the authors show that a generalized Taylor
Principle applies, in which the average anticipated path of policy responses to inﬂation is subject
to a lower bound of unity. This result helps explain how bond rates may exhibit stable responses to
inﬂation, even in periods of passive policy. Another possible explanation is time-varying term
premiums with risk pricing that depends on inﬂation. The authors present a no-arbitrage model of
the term structure with horizon-dependent policy perceptions and time-varying term premiums to
illustrate the mechanics and provide empirical results that support these transmission channels.
JEL classiﬁcation: E3, E5, N1
Bank classification: Interest rates; Transmission of monetary policy
Résumé
Les auteurs montrent que, si les taux obligataires forment le canal de transmission de la politique
monétaire, l’application du principe de Taylor est généralisable. Le nouveau principe exige que la
moyenne des réactions du taux directeur à l’inﬂation soit perçue comme étant au moins égale à
un. Ce résultat permet d’expliquer comment la réaction des taux obligataires à l’évolution de
l’inﬂation peut se révéler stable même lorsque la politique monétaire est passive. Une autre
explication possible est que les primes de terme varient dans le temps en fonction de l’inﬂation.
Pour illustrer les mécanismes en jeu et obtenir des résultats empiriques à l’appui des deux canaux
de transmission avancés, les auteurs présentent un modèle de structure des taux sans arbitrage où
les perceptions de la politique monétaire dépendent d’un horizon temporel et où les primes de
terme ﬂuctuent avec le temps.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E3, E5, N1
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Taux d’intérêt; Transmission de la politique monétaire1. Introduction
“Monetary policy works largely through indirect channels–in particular, by inﬂuencing
private-sector expectations and thus long-term interest rates.” Bernanke (2004)
“Financial markets are the channel through which our policy affects the economy, and
assetpricescontainvaluableinformationaboutinvestors’expectationsforthecourseof
policy, economic activity, and inﬂation, as well as the risks about those expectations.”
Kohn (2005)
Most studies of monetary policy focus on the policy interest rate, typically a very short-term
rate, such as an overnight rate. However, as suggested by the above quotations, longer-term bond
rates are essential conduits for the transmission of monetary policy. As bond rates contain bond
trader expectations of future policy rates, not recent policy rates, monetary policy effectiveness
depends on the policy perceptions of the bond market. The connection of these perceptions to
announced or recently observed policy is not fully understood.
Alargeliteraturehasdevelopedtoexplainthehistoricalbehaviorofthetermstructureofinterest
rates. Theimportanceofaccountingforasymmetricinformationonthepartoftheprivatesectorand
the central bank has been shown to be critical for understanding the relationship between short- and
long-term interest rates—particularly in the 1980s (Kozicki and Tinsley 2001 a,b, 2005; Dewachter
and Lyrio (2006c)). Other studies, including Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983), Duffee
(2002), and Dai and Singleton (2002) emphasize the the key role of time-varying term premiums
for capturing time variation in yields. Both of these areas of research form a part of a large literature
exploring the connections between yields of different maturities. Other research, such as Ang and
Piazzesi (2003), and Dewachter, Lyrio, and Maes (2006b) relate yields to macro factors.
Rudebusch and Wu (2004), H¨ ordahl, Tristani and Vestin (2005), and Dewachter and Lyrio
(2006a) use no-arbitrage term-structure models and structural macroeconomic models to relate
bond yields to macroeconomic variables through policy responses of short-term interest rates.
However, even in these papers, the focus remains largely one of explaining yield-curve behaviour
given macroeconomic data, and explaining macroeconomic behaviour given policy rate responses.
Although they comment on the lack of a structural link, Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2006)
establish an empirical link between term premiums and economic activity. Ang, Dong, and Pi-
azzesi (2005) is the closest to our paper in that both papers present no-arbitrage models of the term
structure based on Taylor-type rules that relate policy responses to economic outcomes. New con-
tributions to the literature in this paper include an examination of the conditions for policy stability
1under bond-rate transmission, and the introduction of horizon-dependent policy perceptions in a
no-arbitrage term-structure model.
The primary distinguishing characteristic of the current study is our interest in examining policy
transmission and, in particular, the stability of policy under bond-rate transmission (i.e., the ability
of policy to deliver determinate inﬂation when bond rates inﬂuence economic behaviour). Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), and Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) provide
empirical evidence that in the period before Paul Volcker was appointed Chairman of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve, nominal policy rates exhibited an in-
elastic response (i.e., less than one-for-one) with respect to inﬂation.1 However, to the best of our
knowledge, the responsiveness of bond rates to inﬂation has not been examined. This missing fea-
ture of the literature implies important shortcomings in some interpretations of the Great Inﬂation.
In particular, if the bond rate is the transmission channel for monetary policy, explanations that
focus on the stability of a Taylor rule description of the policy rate or on central bank assumptions
regarding natural rates are not sufﬁcient to assess the stability of the economy and the determinacy
of inﬂation.
In this paper we propose that examinations of the stability of policy in standard DSGE frame-
works ignore some important real-world characteristics of bond rates that are important for policy
transmission. A simple illustrative macroeconomic model suggests that if the bond rate is the prin-
cipal transmission channel, then what matters for stabilizing policy is that the bond-rate average
of the forward rates displays an elastic response to expected inﬂation. Moreover, as already rec-
ognized in the term-structure literature, accounting for asymmetric information and time-varying
term premiums seems likely to be important.
Building on this intuition, the paper presents a no-arbitrage model of the term structure with
horizon-dependent policy expectations and term premiums that reﬂect time-varying compensation
for macroeconomic uncertainty. Within this structure, there are two possible explanations for dif-
ferent inﬂation sensitivities of bond rates compared to policy rates. As suggested by the simple
macroeconomic model, one explanation is that perceived inelastic responses by the policy rate to
inﬂation in the short run may be counterbalanced by elastic responses in the longer run. A second
possible explanation is that forward-rate term premiums may also be responsive to macroeconomic
variables, including inﬂation. If this is the case, term premiums demanded by traders may compen-
sate for modestly unstable short-run policy.
The central roles of bond rates and the perceptions of bond traders in the transmission of pol-
1The FOMC of the Federal Reserve is responsible for U.S. monetary policy.
2icy are discussed in remaining sections of the paper. Section 2 investigates the responsiveness of
historical bond rates to macro variables since the mid-1960s. Section 3 examines the recent use of
indeterminacy analysis in interpretations of US monetary policy during the 1960s and 1970s and
indicates that an alternative condition for determinacy may be required if the bond rate is the policy
transmission channel. In addition, shortcomings of DSGE models with symmetric information are
discussed. Section 4 brieﬂy sketches a no-arbitrage model of the term structure with term premi-
ums that reﬂect time-varying compensation for macroeconomic uncertainty and the possibility of
horizon-dependent expectations by bond traders. Section 5 presents estimated responses of forward
rates to forecasts of macro variables, and section 6 concludes.
2. The responsiveness of historical bond rates to macro variables
In this section, we present empirical evidence on the responsiveness of historical bond rates to
macroeconomic variables, including inﬂation. Regression results are reported for two monthly
samples: one includes the “passive policy” period prior to 1980 and the second covers a period of
aggressive policy in the 1980s.
We estimate the long-run responses of nominal bond rates, R12h,t for h = 1,3,5,10, to inﬂation,
πt, the level of unemployment, ut, and the difference of unemployment, ∆ut:





12h,t = b0 + b1πt−1 + b11(L)∆πt−1 + b2ut−1 + b22(L)∆ut−1,
where bjj(L) are 11th-order lag polynomials. Inﬂation is measured over the prior 12 months using
the deﬂator for personal consumption expenditures (pce), and unemployment is measured by the
civilian unemployment rate. The bond rates are the nominal rates on 1-year, 3-year, 5-year and
10-year zero-coupon bonds from McCulloch and Kwon (1993). Results are reported in Table 1.
Regressions results reported in the bottom panel of Table 1 span the period after the abandon-
ment of nonborrowed-reserves targeting to the end of the FOMC chairmanship of Paul Volcker,
1982m1 - 1987m7. The results are consistent with bond-trader forecasts of aggressive policy re-
sponses to inﬂation. Long-run mean responses by bond rates to inﬂation are well above unity for all
maturities. Signiﬁcant long-run mean responses are also indicated for the change in unemployment
by 1-year and 3-year bond rates. No mean responses to the level of unemployment are signiﬁcant.
The top panel in Table 1 reports on regressions for a 1966-79 sample, ending just prior to the
3announcement of the well-known shift in operational policy in October 1979.2 The second column
in the top panel indicates that the mean long-run response to inﬂation is above unity for bond rates
of all maturities. Perhaps consistent with bond-trader perceptions of the emphasis of 1970s central-
bank policy on money-growth targeting, as discussed in Kozicki and Tinsley (2007), the mean
long-run response to the change of the unemployment rate is also signiﬁcant for all maturities.
Overall, the results of Table 1 are consistent with elastic bond-rate responses to inﬂation in both
samples, raising the question of how to evaluate the determinacy of policy. The speciﬁc question
we examine is whether it is possible for policy to be passive yet for inﬂation to be determinate. In
the remaining sections of this paper, we show that such apparently contradictory observations are
indeed possible.
3. Bond-rate transmission of monetary policy
In this section we use a simple model to show how determinacy conditions for policy may change
whenpolicyanticipationsareallowedtobehorizondependent. Theresultshighlighttheimportance
of considering anticipations of the path of policy.
Speciﬁcations of interest rates in the output equations of empirical macroeconomic models vary
widely. However, in structural macroeconomic models, most speciﬁcations use one-period rates,
with few identifying possible distinct roles for long-term rates. That said, models with explicit
one-period rates do not necessarily imply that bond rates are unimportant in policy transmission.
Consider, for instance, the purely forward-looking IS equation,
˜ yt = Et˜ yt+1 − a(˜ rt − Et˜ πt+1) (1)
relating equilibrium deviations in output ˜ yt to equilibrium deviations in the ex ante one-period
real rate. Here, the latter is represented as the difference between equilibrium deviations in the
nominal rate, ˜ rt, and equilibrium deviations in expected inﬂation Et˜ πt+1. After recursive forward
substitution, this expression implies a relationship between output and long-horizon averages of
equilibrium real-rate deviations:











2The federal funds market was not well-developed prior to 1966, vid. Tinsley et al. (1982) and Fuhrer (1996).





i=1 ˜ rt+i, is typically taken as the equilibrium deviation of an n-period nominal-bond
rate, ˜ Rn,t. Thus, such structural models can be used to provide a link between macroeconomic
activity and bond yields. Indeed, (1) motivates the simple macroeconomic model used in the next
subsection to discuss conditions for determinate policy.
However, even more sophisticated model speciﬁcations that include, for example, habit for-
mation in consumption or time-to-build in investment, may miss important aspects of bond-rate
transmission of policy. Shortcomings are likely because DSGE models are generally constrained
by restrictive assumptions such as time-invariant (or zero) risk premiums and symmetric informa-
tion. The second subsection expands on limitations of typical DSGE models.
3.1 Determinacy conditions with horizon-dependent policy perceptions
Thegeneralpresumptionintheliteratureisthatevidenceofpassivemonetarypolicyimpliesthatthe
central bank and the private sector may have been inﬂuenced by exogenous inﬂationary sunspots.
However, if the principal transmission channel of monetary policy is through the responses em-
bedded in private sector borrowing rates, then conditions for determinacy of inﬂation depend on
passivity of the anticipated path of future policy rates. Thus, the sunspot interpretation is based
on two untested assumptions: First, that bond traders can infer, in real time, that the central bank
policy is passive.3 And second, that the passivity of monetary policy is expected to persist over
lengthy forecast horizons. With regard to these assumptions, Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, 2001b)
indicate that private sector perceptions of the implicit central-bank target for inﬂation were very
slow to adjust—the mean lag of adjustment of the perceived inﬂation target consistent with Trea-
sury bond rates exceeded 5 years in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, FOMC announcements in the
1970s regarding explicit policy targets were limited to one-year horizons. Overall, it is not obvious
that bond traders would extrapolate difﬁculties in reaching one-year objectives to policy failure in
the long run.
3In contrast to the regression analysis in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), empirical analysis in Kozicki and Tinsley
(2007) uses the retrospective advantage of access to the central bank real-time forecasts of explanatory variables. If
external observers are not privy to central bank information, Beyer and Farmer (2004) illustrate that it is not always
possible for the observers to discriminate between determinate and indeterminate policies.
5We introduce horizon-dependent policy in a simple linear DSGE model:
˜ yt = −a(R2,t −
1
2
Et(˜ πt+1 + ˜ πt+2)) + et




(˜ rt,1 + ˜ rt,2)
˜ rt,k = ckEt˜ πt+k k = 1,2 (3)
where ˜ xt denotes the equilibrium deviation of variable xt. The ﬁrst equation in (3) indicates that
deviationsinoutput, ˜ yt aredeterminedbyequilibriumdeviationsinthetwo-periodexanterealbond
rate, Et{ ˜ R2,t− 1
2Et(˜ πt+1+˜ πt+2)}, and by a stochastic disturbance, et. To facilitate the derivation of
closed-form results, a 2-period bond rate replaces the n-period rate in (2). In the second equation,
equilibrium deviations in the inﬂation rate, ˜ πt, are determined by a standard New Keynesian (NK)
pricing equation under assumptions necessary for the output gap to be proportional to marginal
cost. The notation ˜ rt,k is used to represent the expectation in t of the policy rate in t + k. This
notation will facilitate analysis of horizon-dependent policy. The third equation deﬁnes the two-
period bond-rate deviation in t to be equal to the average of one-period nominal rate deviations for
each of the next two periods as expected in t. The fourth equation describes the expected policy
path and relates equilibrium deviations in the nominal policy rate to expected inﬂation deviations.
Note that the perception of the future policy response, c2, is not restricted to be identical to the
response perceived in the current period, c1.4
Substituting the ﬁrst, third and fourth equations in (3) into the second equation gives a second-
order equation for inﬂation






Et˜ πt+2 + bet. (4)
The solution for inﬂation has the form:








4Here, as elsewhere in this paper, conditions for determinacy can be extended to include policy responses to equi-
librium deviations in real activity. Strictly speaking, conditions for determinacy are system properties and not just
limited to the inﬂation responsiveness of current and anticipated real policy rates, such as models where nominal in-
terest rates may play an important stabilizing role, vid. Beyer and Farmer (2004). To simplify exposition, discussion
in this paper assumes real variables, such as output, are responsive only to real interest rates, consistent with responses
by households and ﬁrms in conventional NK models.





λ1 + λ2 =
2 − ab(c1 − 1)
ab(c2 − 1)
. (6)
The perceptions of the bond traders must satisfy three conditions for determinacy, vid. Woodford
(2003)












In this formulation, upper bounds for the policy responses are summarized by the ﬁrst two condi-
tions in (7). These bounds will depend on the particular speciﬁcations of the model. In the case
where c1 = c2, the second condition puts no constraints on the parameters of the perceived policy
path.
The third requirement for determinacy in (7) is a generalization of the Taylor Principle. If policy
is not horizon-dependent, then c1 = c2 and the determinacy condition simpliﬁes to the standard
Taylor Principle that the nominal policy rate must be respond at least one-for-one to expected
inﬂation.
With horizon-dependency in the perceived policy path, determinacy requires that the average
anticipated response to expected inﬂation over the maturity of the bond should exceed unity. Thus,
even if the current period response is passive, c1 < 1, the average perceived response may satisfy
the lower bound requirement for determinacy.6
3.2 Pitfalls of standard NK speciﬁcations
A feature of standard NK models is that the link between bond rates and policy rates is treated very
simplistically—forward averages of policy rates are generally viewed as bond-rate proxies. This
5The roots of the associated companion form system for (4) are derived in the appendix.
6Note that the exercise conducted here is different than that in McGough, Rudebusch, and Williams (2005), where
the bond rate is the monetary-policy instrument. For comparison, in the case of the two-period bond rate, determinacy
in their set-up requires that the bond rate in t respond at least one-for-one to inﬂation in t, i.e., R2,t = cBπt with
cB > 1.
7mapping ignores two potentially important features of the real world—time-varying term premiums
and asymmetric information on the part of the central bank and the private sector.
The treatment of time-varying term premiums in a no-arbitrage model of the term structure is
explored in the next section. In NK models, term-premium effects are generally absent by assump-
tion. A recent exception is Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2006) who develop a structural model
in which the sign of the correlation between the term premium and output depends on the nature of
the shock hitting the economy. However, they note that their structural model is unable to repro-
duce the magnitude and variation of term premiums observed in the bond market. Moreover, while
their model incorporates time-varying term premiums, it assumes symmetric information.
The problem of asymmetric information is an important drawback of most structural models
that formulate output equations as functions of the one-period rate. Given that theory indicates
forecasts of long-horizon returns in bond markets are important determinants of private-sector ex-
penditures, the information set of bond traders is more pertinent than that of a macro modeler. The
bond-trader information set is likely to differ, and may be larger than the macro modeler. Unless
the modeler ensures that the averages of forward rates generated by the model are equivalent to
observed bond rates, the model description of policy transmission will reﬂect the modeler’s priors
regarding long-horizon forecasts, and these may differ markedly from the long-horizon forecasts
contained in bond-market observations.7
In contrast to the assumptions made in structural models, empirical results from reduced-form
analyses are generally supportive of an independent role for long-term interest rates. Kozicki and
Tinsley (2002) explore competing speciﬁcations of short-term and long-term interest rates in output
equations. If frictions in adjusting real expenditures are important, we might expect long-term
ex-ante real interest rates should dominate competing short-term real-rate regressors in reduced-
form regressions. Indeed, they provide empirical evidence indicating that long-term real rates
are relatively more important. Results are reported for a sequence of bivariate tests, where U.S.
manufacturing utilization, a proxy for the output gap, is regressed on competing short-term and
long-termex-anterealinterestratesovera1967m1-1997m7sample. Thetestsconﬁrmthatspreads
between the long-term and short-term interest rates are statistically insigniﬁcant when regressions
are conditioned on the long-term rates and, conversely, long-short spreads are signiﬁcant when
regressions are conditioned on the short-term interest rates. Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2006)
construct several estimates of time-varying term premiums and use these estimates to examine the
7The sensitivity of long-horizon forecasts to alternative modeling assumptions regarding time-variation in condi-
tional equilibria is illustrated in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, 2001b).
8link between movements in the term premium and subsequent economic activity.8 In general, they
ﬁnd that a decline in the term premium has typically been associated with higher future real GDP
growth.
Overall, these results suggest that an important direction for future research will be to incorpo-
rate time-varying premiums and asymmetric information into structural models. In addition, while
not examined in the current paper, the explanatory role of credit risk premiums in private borrow-
ing rates is empirically supported in Kozicki and Tinsley (2002), arguing for consideration of other
forms of private-sector risk.
4. No-arbitrage bond pricing with time-varying risk premiums
and horizon-dependent perceptions
As noted earlier, bond rates may exhibit elastic responses to inﬂation at the same time that policy-
rate settings appear to indicate passive policy. One possibility, as suggested in the previous section,
is that coefﬁcients of the perceived policy response may vary over the forecast horizon. Another
possibility—one not examined in section 3—is that term premiums may vary systematically with
macroeconomic variables.9
The next subsection describes a no-arbitrage model of bond pricing that incorporates term-
premium responses to macroeconomic determinants of policy rates, such as inﬂation, and also
allows for horizon-dependent expectations.10 To establish terminology, the nominal yield on an


















rt,i + Ψn,t. (8)
8As Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson note, estimates of term premiums depend on assumptions regarding long-
horizon expectations of the equilibrium real rate and the inﬂation anchor.
9In the model of section 3, term premiums of bond rates were assumed to be constant over time and drop out of
equilibrium deviations.
10Recent examples of empirical estimates of the term structure exploring macro variable determinants of term pre-
miums include Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Rudebusch and Wu (forthcoming,2004), Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2005),
Duffee (2006), and Dewachter and Lyrio (2006a) and Dewachter, Lyrio, and Maes (2006)).
9The ﬁrst line of (8) indicates that the nominal bond rate is the average of forward rates, ft,i, over
the lifetime of the bond. The second line shows that the forward rate in the ith period of the n-
period forecast horizon is equal to the expected policy rate in the ith period, rt,i, plus a possibly
time-varying forward rate term premium, ψt,i. The last line shows that the term premium of the
n-period bond rate, Ψt,n, is equal to the average of the forward-rate term premiums.11
This format clariﬁes possible roles of time-varying term premiums. Positive term-premium
responses to inﬂation may reconcile elastic nominal bond-rate responses with passive policy. In
addition, with systematic positive responses to inﬂation, time-varying term premiums may operate
as automatic stabilizers, reducing the effective lower bound required for determinate policy.
4.1 The model
In themodel wepresent, bond pricesdepend onthe currentstate andfuture evolutionof themacroe-
conomy. We represent the dynamics of macroeconomic variables with a ﬁrst-order companion-
form system, where, for notational simplicity, a constant is included in the X vector:12
Xt = ΦXt−1 + Σt, t ∼ N(0,I). (9)
The policy rate in period t + h anticipated by bond traders in period t, rt,h is assumed to be a




where the vector of response parameters, δh+1 may vary over the forecast horizon.
In the absence of arbitrage, the price of a multiperiod asset that does not pay dividends is
determined by the expected product of stochastic discount factors, Mt+i, over the lifetime of the
asset. In the case of a zero-coupon n-period nominal bond paying $1 at maturity, the current price
is:
Pn,t = Et{Mt+1Mt+2 ...Mt+n},
= Et{Mt+1Pn−1,t+1}, (11)
11In the terminology of Shiller (1990), Ψn,t is the rollover term premium.
12This format nests the reduced form of linear structural macroeconomic models.














where, following Duffee (2002), the price of risk is the essentially-afﬁne formulation:13
λt+i = λ0 + λ
0
1Xt+i. (14)
The second term in (13) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative that translates the distribution of the
discounted asset price to a martingale by removing predictable drift due to bond risk premiums.14
If investors are risk neutral, λt+i = 0, and Mt+i+1 = exp{rt+i}.
As in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), discrete-time bond prices in this Gaussian afﬁne




= exp{−An − B
0
nXt}, (15)
where expressions for An and Bn can be derived by substituting for Mt+i from (13). Under the
13For identiﬁcation, the elements of λ1 that multiply the constant in Xt are restricted to equal zero. Constants are
included separately to facilitate the derivation. In the absence of an explicit speciﬁcation of investor utility functions,
no theoretical restrictions are imposed on the λ0
1 matrix. As the dimensions of the pricing matrix can be large, empirical
investigations of essentially afﬁne formulations of asset pricing often impose zero restrictions on elements of the λ0
1
matrix, such as Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2005), and Dewachter and Lyrio (forthcoming(a)
and forthcoming(b)). Kim and Orphanides (2005) suggest fewer zero restrictions are required if measurements include
both bond-rate data and surveys of interest-rate forecasts over short and long horizons. Depending on the structure of
the λ1 matrix, term premium variation linked to a variable may not reﬂect uncertainty in that variable. For example,
suppose Σλ0













s11λ11 + s12λ21 s11λ12 + s12λ22






Note that responses of the term premium to movements in x2,t may not be related to the scale of the x2 shock, s22.
14Change of drift under the Girsanov theorem is discussed in Dufﬁe(1996).





























= exp[−A1 − B
0
1Xt]. (16)
Since rt,1 ≡ R1,t = −log(P1t) and rt,1 = δ0
1Xt, it follows that
A1 = 0
B1 = δ1.












































The notation convention is that negative entries of λ1 contribute towards positive risk premiums.
Consequently, sinceRn,t = (1/n)(An+B0
nXt), ascanbeseenintheﬁnallineof(17), thesensitivity
of bond rates to variations in the macro variables, Xt, may be increased if elements of λ1 are
negative.
4.2 Forward-rate expressions
The formulations in (17) are particularly convenient for analysis of forward rates. The forward rate,
fn−1, is
ft,n−1 = rt,n−1 + ψt,n−1,
= pn−1,t − pn,t
= An − An−1 + (Bn − Bn−1)
0Xt















































Thus, with horizon-dependent perceptions of policy responses, the forward rate, ft,h−1, satisﬁes





















Estimates of EtXt+h−1 obtained from projections of the empirical model in (9) with estimated
coefﬁcients permit exploration of “Taylor rule” regressions for forward rates with possibly horizon-
varying coefﬁcients, δ0
h(I − Σλ0
1Φ−1)h−1, h = 1,2,....
To determine an expression for the term premiums, notice that in the absence of term premiums,
the forward-rate regression reduces to




= Ch + δ
0
hEtXt+h−1.
Thus, forward rate term premiums are deﬁned by









If the effect of the risk-pricing matrix, λ0
1, is such that (Φ − Σλ0
1)h is slower to decay than Φh, the
slope contributions of forward rate term premiums will increase over the forecast horizon with h.15
5. Empirical responses of forward rates
This section provides a direct evaluation of the combined effects of term-premium and expected-
policy-rate responses by estimating forward-rate response equations over different forward hori-
zons. The possibility of time-varying forward-rate term premiums and horizon-dependent expecta-
15The Jordan form of a matrix, A = PΛP−1, implies Ai = PΛiP−1.
13tions of future policy-rate responses suggests that forward-rate responses to expectations of future
macro variables may differ from the current-period policy-rate responses estimated by Taylor rules.
The macro variables we use to summarize economic activity are inﬂation, πt, and the unem-
ployment rate, ut. The unemployment rate appears to be an appropriate summary measure of real
activity because, as was discussed in Kozicki and Tinsley (2007), it seems likely that the FOMC
used aggregate unemployment as a measure of resource slack. Moreover, the change in the unem-
ployment rate provides a proxy for economic growth.
Each macro variable is partitioned into its perceived equilibrium attractor or “natural rate,” such
as (¯ πt, ¯ ut), and deviations from these natural rates.16
πt ≡ ¯ πt + ˜ πt,
ut ≡ ¯ ut + ˜ ut. (20)
The empirical macro model describes the dynamics of four variables: the perceived natural rate
of unemployment, ¯ ut, deviations of the unemployment rate from its perceived natural rate, ˜ ut =
ut − ¯ ut, the perceived central-bank target for inﬂation, ¯ πt, and deviations of inﬂation from this
perception, ˜ πt = πt − ¯ πt. In the ﬁrst subsection we provide more details on the data used and the
structure of the empirical macroeconomic model.
For monthly observations, the instantaneous forward rates at twelve-month intervals in the fore-
cast horizon are represented by
ft,12h = (1 − ρ1)f
∗
t,12h + ρ1ft,12(h−1) + ρ2∆
(k)ft,12(h−1) + at,12h, (21)
in which the forward rate associated with the bond-trader expectation of the policy rate in the
absence of policy lag adjustments is
f
∗
t,12h = Et{c0 + c1¯ πt + c2˜ π
(¯ k)
t,12h + c3˜ ut,12h + c4∆
(k)ut,12h},
where ˜ πt,12h is the projected deviation of inﬂation in the 12hth month of the forecast horizon; ˜ ut,12h
is the projected deviation of unemployment from bond trader perceptions of the unemployment nat-
ural rate, ¯ ut; and the superscripts, (¯ k) and (k), denote k-period averages and k-period summations,
respectively.17 For monthly data, k = 12.
16In a slight abuse of conventional terminology, it is convenient to refer to the central bank target for inﬂation
perceived by bond traders, ¯ πt, as the “natural rate” for inﬂation.
17The k-period summation of the ﬁrst-difference operator is the k-period difference, ∆(k) = ∆ + ∆L + ... +
14As the speciﬁcation in (21) is amenable to direct regression, it is straightforward to check if
estimates of combined responses, such as c2, are consistent with stable bond rate responses, and if
responses vary over different partitions of the forecast horizon. The regressions reported here do
not impose the cross-equation restrictions implied by no-arbitrage, as derived in section 4, on the
forward-rate regressions of different horizons. Consequently, it is not possible to determine what
proportions of combined responses are due to forward-rate term-premium responses, Σλ0
1, or to
expected policy-rate responses, δh. There is one exception: under the physical probability measure,
the expected response to the perceived inﬂation target is unity, c1 = 1. Thus, signiﬁcant deviations
from c1 = 1 indicate time variation in forward-rate term premiums due to a time-varying inﬂation
target, ¯ πt.
5.1 Forecast model
The structure of the empirical model, particularly the expressions describing the evolution of the
natural rates, is very important when making long-horizon forecasts. Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a,
2001b) demonstrate that long-horizon predictions from VAR models are sensitive to speciﬁcations
regarding the conditional equilibria of state variables. For instance if the perceived equilibrium or
central bank target for inﬂation is ﬁxed at the sample mean, then implied constructions of ex-ante
5-year and 10-year real bond rates appear to be trending up in the 1970s. By contrast, if ¯ πt closely
tracks recent inﬂation, as would be the case if ¯ πt is estimated as the Beveridge-Nelson (1981) unit-
root trend, ex-ante real bond rates are much more volatile and fall sharply below zero in the ﬁrst
half of the 1970s. Finally, more gradual movements in ¯ πt that are consistent with survey data imply
ex-ante real rates on 5-year and 10-year bonds that move without much of a discernible trend in the
1970s.
For the forward-rate regressions reported below, the time-varying perceptions of bond traders
for the central-bank target for inﬂation, ¯ πt, and the natural rate for unemployment, ¯ ut, are repre-
sented by the constant-gain learning equations:
¯ πt = γ¯ ππt−1 + (1 − γ¯ π)¯ πt−1 + ε¯ π,t,
¯ ut = γ¯ uut−1 + (1 − γ¯ u)¯ ut−1 + ε¯ u,t. (22)
Kozicki and Tinsley (2001b) indicate that a monthly gain of γ¯ π = .015 provides an average approx-
imation of private-sector long-horizon forecasts of inﬂation in the 1980s. This benchmark constant-
gain proxy for bond-trader perceptions of the central-bank target for inﬂation, ¯ πt, is shown in Figure
∆Lk−1 = 1 − Lk.
151, along with the 12-month moving average of pce inﬂation and the Hoey real-time survey of 5-10
year predictions of CPI inﬂation. Reductions in survey predictions of long-horizon inﬂation and in
the perceived inﬂation target lag considerably the fall of inﬂation in the early 1980s.
The same benchmark learning rate is assumed for bond-trader perceptions of the natural rate
of unemployment, γ¯ u = .015. The associated constant-gain proxy for the natural rate of unem-
ployment is shown in Figure 2, along with the historical unemployment rate and the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce (2004) retrospective estimate of the natural rate. As with many real-time estimates
of the natural rate of unemployment, the constant-gain proxy tracks below the retrospective CBO
estimate in the 1970s, with an average underestimation error of about 1.25 percentage points in the
ﬁrst half of the 1970s before the error sharply diminishes in the remainder of the 1970s.
Given the sensitivity of long-horizon forecasts to the speciﬁcation of the perceived central-bank
target for inﬂation, we examine the effects of three constant-gain learning rates. In the case of a
ﬁxed inﬂation target, the learning rate is set to zero, γ¯ π = 0.0, and the perceived inﬂation target
is set to the sample mean. The benchmark perception of the central bank inﬂation target, shown
in Figure 1, uses the constant-gain learning rate, γ¯ π = .015, which implies a mean learning lag of
about 5.5 years. Finally, a faster learning rate is also examined for perceptions of the central bank
target for inﬂation, γ¯ π = .03, with a mean learning lag of about 2.8 years.18
Time-variation in the natural-rate deviations of inﬂation and unemployment is captured by a
pth-order, bivariate vector autoregression,
˜ πt = a11,1˜ πt−1 +
p−1 X
i=1
a11,i+1∆˜ πt−i + a12,1˜ ut−1 +
p−1 X
i=1
a12,i+1∆˜ ut−i + ε˜ π,t,
˜ ut = a21,1˜ πt−1 +
p−1 X
i=1
a21,i+1∆˜ πt−i + a22,1˜ ut−1 +
p−1 X
i=1
a22,i+1∆˜ ut−i + ε˜ u,t., (23)
If the macro system is stable, each macro variable reverts to its natural rate in the long run. Monthly
predictions of expected inﬂation, Etπt,12h, and unemployment, Etut,12h, are generated by a 12th-
order empirical model of inﬂation and unemployment, whose format is shown in (23).
18Results in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, 2005b) indicate that learning rates need not be constant over time. Faster
learning rates are more likely if agents perceive larger forecast errors for observable variables and can reduce the real
consequences of perception errors in episodes with a time-varying inﬂation target. But, faster constant-gain learning
rates are inefﬁcient in more tranquil periods, as larger responses to transient disturbances increase the dispersion of the
ergodic distribution of perceived inﬂation targets about a ﬁxed central-bank target.
165.2 Forward-rate regressions
The empirical analysis of forward rates uses data for forward rates at 1-year, 3-year, 5-year and
10-year horizons. As forward rates at neighbouring horizons tend to move closely, the forward-
rate regressions are grouped into three horizon partitions: 1-3 years, 4-6 years, and 7-10 years.
Assuming that perceived policy-rate responses do not vary signiﬁcantly within a partition, this
grouping should increase precisions of estimates. That said, because the term-premium responses
within a partition are not likely to be identical, unless they are zero, the regression residuals will be
heteroskedastic reﬂecting deviations from estimated average responses.
Forward-rate regressions for the three partitions are presented in Tables 2a and 2b for a pre-
Volcker sample, 1966 m1 - 1979 m7.19 Forecasts of inﬂation and unemployment regressors for
results in Table 2a are generated by ﬁtting the empirical macro model to the 1960-79 sample under
the assumption of the benchmark learning rates, γ¯ π = γ¯ u = .015. The mean long-run response to
the equilibrium deviation in inﬂation, ˜ πt, is statistically insigniﬁcant for forward rates in the 1-3
year partition; is not statistically different from unity for forward rates in the 4-6 year partition; and
is greater than unity for forward rates in the 7-10 year partition. Thus, the pattern of increasing
responses over the forecast horizon is consistent with elastic responses to expected inﬂation by
intermediate-maturity bond rates in the 1960s and 1970s. Although mean responses to the forecast
level or difference of the unemployment rate are negative, mean responses are not signiﬁcant in the
1-3 and 4-6 year partitions. Although the signs of term-premium responses may be opposite to the
signs of expected policy-rate responses, it is unlikely the combined response would overturn the
direction of the expected policy-rate response.20
Forward-rate responses to expected inﬂation under alternative learning rates are examined in
Table 2b for the pre-Volcker sample. The pattern of increasing inﬂation responses over the forecast
horizon is relatively insensitive to variation in the assumed learning rate. However, determinacy
of bond-rate responses to expected inﬂation is better supported for perceptions of a ﬁxed inﬂation
target, γ¯ π = 0.0, or the time-varying inﬂation target generated by the benchmark learning rate,
19During this interval, the FOMC was chaired by William McChesney Martin, Jr, Arthur Burns, and G. William
Miller.
20Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) report positive term premiums for inﬂation, with larger premiums for longer maturi-
ties. Dewachter and Lyrio (forthcoming(b)) estimate positive term premiums for inﬂation that rise with maturity and
negligible term premiums for GDP gaps. Positive term premiums are also estimated for a time-varying central tendency
for inﬂation, similar to ¯ πt; these premiums also rise with maturity and are nearly triple the size of the term premiums
for inﬂation. By contrast, Duffee (2006) presents evidence of negative term-premium responses to inﬂation in a pre-
Volcker sample. Note that negative term-premium responses to inﬂation could conceivably reverse the historical roles
of the inﬂation responses by the central bank and bond traders suggested in section 3. That is, system indeterminacy
could occur if an elastic policy-rate response to inﬂation is accompanied by inelastic bond-rate responses to expected
inﬂation.
17γ¯ π = .015.
Tables 3a and 3b present forward-rate regressions for the sample 1982 m1 - 1987 m7, a period
that encompasses the last six and one-half years of the FOMC chairmanship of Paul Volcker but
excludes the unusual interest-rate volatility in 1979-81, during the experiment with nonborrowed
reserves as the operating policy instrument. In Table 3a, the forward-rate response to expected
inﬂation, c2, is not statistically different from unity in the 1-3 year partition, and greater than unity
in the 4-6 year partition, although not signiﬁcantly so. The mean inﬂation response in the 7-10 year
partition is greater than unity but the associated p-value is marginally larger than .10. As with the
earlier sample, forward rates do not appear to consistently respond to forecasts of unemployment.
The estimated forward-rate responses to the perceived inﬂation target, ¯ π, in Table 3a are sig-
niﬁcantly greater than unity in the 1-3 year and 4-6 year partitions. Under the physical probability
measure, the expected coefﬁcient of the inﬂation target is one, so this suggests forward-rate term
premiums responded positively to the perceived inﬂation target in the 1980s.
Forward-rate responses to expected inﬂation in the 1980s under alternative learning rates are
examined in Table 3b. Here, the pattern of increasing responses to expected inﬂation over the fore-
cast horizon is statistically supported when the inﬂation-target learning rate is equal to or exceeds
the benchmark learning rate. The case with no learning is likely to be a particularly bad assumption
for this sample, as it incorporates a period immediately after a large change in policy regime with
sizable reductions in inﬂation. Positive responses of forward-rate term premiums to the perceived
inﬂation target, c1 > 1, are also indicated for the benchmark learning rate, γ¯ π = .015, and the faster
learning rate, γ¯ π = .03.
Although the forward-rate regressions provide only rough approximations of combined
forward-rate responses to macro variables, two results appear to be common to the pre-Volcker
sample and the 1980s sample. First, forward-rate responses to equilibrium deviations in inﬂa-
tion are generally larger at more distant horizons and often greater than one, consistent with elastic
bond-rate responses to inﬂation. Second, there is little evidence of systematic responses by forward
rates to the level or difference of unemployment. A notable difference in sample results is that pos-
itive responses by forward-rate term premiums to a time-varying inﬂation target are supported in
the 1980s sample although not in the pre-Volcker sample.
186. Concluding remarks
This paper re-examines the stability of monetary policy, taking into account the transmission role
of bond yields. Some interpretations of the Great Inﬂation have focused on the stability of a Taylor-
rule description of the policy rate or on central-bank assumptions regarding natural rates. However,
these possible shortcomings in policy are not sufﬁcient to assess the stability of the economy if
the bond rate is the transmission channel for monetary policy. With bond-rate transmission, we
show that conditions for determinate inﬂation require a lower bound on bond-rate responses to
expected inﬂation. Consequently, mildly passive current policy may be compensated by bond-
trader perceptions of aggressive policy later.
Such horizon-dependence in policy anticipations may explain elastic nominal bond-rate re-
sponses to inﬂation, even in the 1960s and 1970s—a period for which other studies have demon-
strated that the policy rate did not keep pace with inﬂation. Another resolution of possible con-
tradictory sensitivities to inﬂation by policy rates and bond rates is that risk prices in forward-rate
term premiums may depend on expected inﬂation and operate as automatic stabilizers, reducing the
lower-bound requirement for expected policy-rate responses.
In investigating historical behaviour of policy rates and bond rates, we also note the importance
of allowing for asymmetric information on the part of the central bank and the private sector. Al-
though structural dynamic expenditure equations are often formulated as functions only of the one-
period interest rate, the elimination of market bond-rate observations substitutes the information
set of the modeler for the more relevant information set of bond traders in long-horizon forecasts.
To accommodate these possibilities, we present a variant of the essentially afﬁne model of
no-arbitrage bond pricing that allows for horizon-dependent expectations of policy-rate responses
and incorporates time-varying term premiums. This model provides a framework for interpreting
forward-rate responses to equilibrium deviations in expected inﬂation. Forward-rate regressions
provide empirical support for the conjecture that forward-rate responses at more distant horizons
display larger long-run responses to equilibrium deviations in expected inﬂation. The regressions
also suggest forward-rate term premiums responded positively to perceptions of a time-varying
inﬂation target in the 1980s but not in the 1960s and 1970s.
In future work we look to isolate the separate contributions of time-varying term premiums
and horizon-dependent expectations of future policy rates. This will require imposing no-arbitrage
cross-equation restrictions on the forward-rate regressions. If horizon-dependent perceptions are
conﬁrmed, it would be useful to explore possible reasons for horizon dependency in expectations.
19If long-horizon expectations are merely inertial, that inertia can partially insulate the economy
from poor monetary policies, as may have occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, but may also attenuate
responses to new monetary policies.
20Appendix A: Eigenvalues of the companion form for equation (4)
The second-order inﬂation equation






Et˜ πt+2 + bet,
is restated in the ﬁrst-order companion form
A1yt+1 = A0yt + aeet + aηηt,
where y0
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24Table 1: Bond-rate responsiveness to macro variables 1.
R
∗
12h,t = b0 + b1πt−1 + b11(L)∆πt−1 + b2ut−1 + b22(L)∆ut−1.
R12h,t = b3R12h,t−1 + b33(L)∆R12h,t−1 + (1 − b3)R
∗
12h,t + at,12h.
bond π u ∆u
rate b1 b2 b22(1) b3 Prob(b1 > 1)
sample: 1966 m1 - 1979 m9
h = 1 1.37 -1.28 -1.94 .880 .77
(2.8) (-2.0) (-3.1) (12)
h = 3 1.06 -.889 -1.44 .864 .58
(3.8) (-2.3) (-3.2) (13)
h = 5 1.05 -.853 -1.15 .864 .58
(3.6) (-2.1) (-3.2) (15)
h = 10 1.12 -.904 -.812 .898 .64
(3.4) (-1.8) (-3.0) (20)
sample: 1982 m1 - 1987 m7
h = 1 1.96 .068 -3.92 .704 .99
(4.9) (.19) (-2.8) (7.8)
h = 3 1.95 .214 -2.97 .757 .96
(3.7) (.50) (-2.1) (10)
h = 5 1.73 .338 -2.42 .774 .87
(2.7) (.71) (-1.5) (11)
h = 10 1.20 .551 -2.42 .795 .60
(1.6) (1.0) (-1.5) (12)
1. bii(L) are 11th-order polynomials in L. Parentheses contain ratios of coefﬁcients to
asymptotic standard errors.
25Table 2a: Forward-rate regressions, pre-Volcker 1966 - 1979,





c0 + c1¯ πt + c2˜ π
(¯ k)




ft,12h = ρ1ft,12(h−1) + ρ2∆
(k)ft,12(h−1) + (1 − ρ1)f
∗
t,12h + at,12h.
forward ¯ π ˜ π(k) ˜ u ∆(k)u
rate c1 c2 c3 c4 ρ1 ρ2
time-varying perceived natural rates, γ¯ π = γ¯ u = 0.015
h = 1-3 .588 -.042 – – .513 -.009
(9.2) (-0.4) (16) (-0.2)
.581 -.042 -.023 – .509 -.005
(9.1) (-0.4) (-0.3) (15) (-0.1)
.581 .056 – -.172 .518 -.017
(9.0) (0.3) (-0.6) (16) (-0.4)
h = 4-6 .904 .661 – – .877 .219
(10) (2.5) (38) (2.5)
.861 .375 -.564 – .873 .211
(8.5) (1.5) (-1.5) (39) (2.4)
.860 2.92 – -2.65 .873 .211
(8.4) (1.8) (-1.5) (39) (2.4)
h = 7-10 .796 2.70 – – .967 .877
(25) (3.9) (178) (20)
.813 1.32 -2.86 – .967 .873
(25) (1.8) (-3.7) (179) (20)
.813 13.8 – -13.1 .967 .873
(25) (4.3) (-3.7) (179) (20)
1. Superscript (¯ k) denotes k-period averages. For monthly data, k = 12. Parentheses
contain ratios of coefﬁcients to HAC standard errors.
VAR forecast model sample: 1960 m1 - 1979 m7.
26Table 2b: Forward-rate regressions, pre-Volcker 1966 - 1979,





c0 + c1¯ πt + c2˜ π
(¯ k)




ft,12h = ρ1ft,12(h−1) + ρ2∆
(k)ft,12(h−1) + (1 − ρ1)f
∗
t,12h + at,12h.
forward ¯ π ˜ π(k) ˜ u ∆(k)u
rate c1 c2 c3 c4 ρ1 ρ2
ﬁxed perceived inﬂation target, γ¯ π = γ¯ u = 0.0
h = 1-3 1.0 .320 – – .540 -.037
(5.1) (14) (-0.7)
h = 4-6 1.0 .929 – – .970 .312
(1.8) (54) (3.1)
h = 7-10 1.0 1.59 – – .981 .870
(13) (346) (20)
time-varying perceived inﬂation target, γ¯ π = γ¯ u = 0.015
h = 1-3 .588 -.042 – – .513 -.009
(9.2) (-0.4) (16) (-0.2)
h = 4-6 .904 .661 – – .877 .219
(10) (2.5) (38) (2.5)
h = 7-10 .796 2.70 – – .967 .877
(25) (3.9) (178) (20)
time-varying perceived inﬂation target, γ¯ π = 0.03;γ¯ u = .015
h = 1-3 .499 -.012 – – .503 -.001
(10) (-0.2) (17) (-0.0)
h = 4-6 .670 .422 – – .866 .216
(9.9) (2.1) (36) (2.3)
h = 7-10 .694 1.24 – – .965 .879
(26) (4.0) (164) (20)
1. Superscript (¯ k) denotes k-period averages. For monthly data, k = 12. Parentheses
contain ratios of coefﬁcients to HAC standard errors. VAR forecast model sample:
1960 m1 - 1979 m7.
27Table 3a: Forward-rate regressions, Volcker 1982 - 1987





c0 + c1¯ πt + c2˜ π
(¯ k)




ft,12h = ρ1ft,12(h−1) + ρ2∆
(k)ft,12(h−1) + (1 − ρ1)f
∗
t,12h + at,12h.
forward ¯ π ˜ π(k) ˜ u ∆(k)u
rate c1 c2 c3 c4 ρ1 ρ2
time-varying perceived natural rates: γ¯ π = γ¯ u = 0.015
h = 1-3 3.63 .732 – – 0.574 -.155
(8.4) (2.6) (9.9) (-3.1)
3.62 .731 .007 – .574 -.155
(9.5) (2.8) (0.0) (10) (-3.1)
3.85 .429 – .759 .529 -.120
(9.9) (1.3) (1.9) (9.1) (-2.4)
h = 4-6 3.28 1.12 – – .918 -.232
(3.6) (1.8) (24) (-2.3)
.754 9.18 -20.2 – .955 -.265
(0.2) (1.1) (-1.0) (26) (-2.7)
.226 -1.50 – 13.3 .958 -.268
(0.1) (-0.6) (1.0) (27) (-2.8)
h = 7-10 -.686 6.64 – – .957 .450
(-0.4) (1.6) (60) (5.4)
1.62 -76.1 119 – .942 .485
(2.0) (-2.6) (2.7) (65) (6.4)
2.15 -7.67 – -28.6 .934 .467
(2.7) (-1.9) (-3.2) (60) (6.2)
1. Superscript (¯ k) denotes k-period averages. For monthly data, k = 12. Parentheses
contain ratios of coefﬁcients to HAC standard errors. VAR forecast model sample:
1982 m1 - 1987 m7.
28Table 3b: Forward-rate regressions, Volcker 1982 - 1987,





c0 + c1¯ πt + c2˜ π
(¯ k)




ft,12h = ρ1ft,12(h−1) + ρ2∆
(k)ft,12(h−1) + (1 − ρ1)f
∗
t,12h + at,12h.
forward ¯ π ˜ π(k) ˜ u ∆(k)u
rate c1 c2 c3 c4 ρ1 ρ2
ﬁxed perceived inﬂation target, γ¯ π = γ¯ u = 0.0
h = 1-3 1.0 4.37 – – .850 -.262
(2.1) (24) (-4.8)
h = 4-6 1.0 75.7 – – .978 -.285
(1.1) (53) (-2.9)
h = 7-10 1.0 36.2 – – .936 .412
(0.9) (80) (4.6)
time-varying perceived inﬂation target, γ¯ π = γ¯ u = 0.015
h = 1-3 3.63 .732 – – .574 -.155
(8.4) (2.6) (9.9) (-3.1)
h = 4-6 3.28 1.12 – – .918 -.232
(3.6) (1.8) (24) (-2.3)
h = 7-10 -.686 6.64 – – .957 .450
(-0.4) (1.6) (60) (5.4)
time-varying perceived inﬂation target, γ¯ π = 0.03;γ¯ u = .015
h = 1-3 2.22 .774 – – .617 -.171
(5.7) (2.3) (10) (-3.3)
h = 4-6 2.04 1.38 – – .933 -.240
(2.8) (1.7) (26) (-2.3)
h = 7-10 1.40 4.01 – – .934 .441
(3.1) (3.2) (61) (5.6)
1. Superscript (¯ k) denotes k-period averages. For monthly data, k = 12. Parentheses
contain ratios of coefﬁcients to HAC standard errors. VAR forecast model sample:
1982 m1 - 1987 m7.













1. solid line: perceived inﬂation target with learning gain, γ¯ π = .015 (see text).
dashed: Hoey survey of expected 5-10 year inﬂation.
dotted: inﬂation in personal consumption expenditure (pce) deﬂator, 12-month average.












1. solid line: perceived natural rate of unemployment with learning gain γ¯ u = .015
(see text).
dashed: Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2004) estimate of natural rate for unemployment.
dotted: civilian unemployment rate.
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